What Does It Mean to Have an Excuse? Reconstructing and Evaluating Rosen's Argument.

Introduction

In this essay, I will expound and evaluate Gideon Rosen's arguments regarding motivational and cognitive excuses. I will ultimately defend the thesis that a theory along Strawsonian lines should be adopted to explain both kinds of excuses, and that such a theory need not be at odds with the Rosenian framework. Excuses absolve one from moral blame without justifying the action itself, and Rosen separates them into two categories: cognitive and motivational. The former involve excuses grounded in ignorance, and the latter involve excuses from duress or coercion. The Strawsonian generalisation states that a wrongdoer is excused if they did not act out of an objectionable quality of will[1]. I will provide two main arguments against Rosen's claim that the quality of will only determines the viability of motivational excuses and not cognitive excuses. The first is that such a claim is inconsistent in its attribution of moral value to quality of will. The second is that such a claim arises from a misinterpretation of the Kleinbart case[2], where Rosen fails to distinguish between having an objectionable quality of will and displaying it, thus conflating manifestations of general ill will with case-specific ill will. Finally, I will use a modified version of the Goldberg case to show that Rosen's framework must rely on quality of will to achieve the intuitive conclusion.

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[1] P. F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment', Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 48 (1962), p. 192-193; see also Gideon Rosen, 'Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 105, No 10 (Oct 2008), p. 607

[2] Gideon Rosen, 'Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 105, No 10 (Oct 2008), p. 605-608

Section I: Exposition of Rosen's General Argument

Motivational Excuses

Regarding motivational excuses, Rosen seems to endorse the Strawsonian generalisation[3]. He considers the case of Dražen Erdemović, who was a Bosnian Croat soldier in the Army of Republika Srpska during the Bosnian War. He was among the perpetrators of the Srebrenica massacre, where over 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were executed. When ordered to execute a busload of unarmed Bosnians, Erdemović protested but was told that if he refused to obey, he would be shot himself[4].

Rosen argues that Erdemović can be morally excused for his crime, even if we modify the case such that he could have saved some lives by disobeying the order (perhaps by inspiring more soldiers to follow suit)[5]. This is because Rosen endorses the Strawsonian view that for an agent to be blameworthy, they must display insufficient concern for the affected parties. The presence of duress gives Erdemović an excuse in that sense. By choosing to follow the orders, Erdemović does not display a lack of concern for others; rather, he shows unwillingness to sacrifice his own life. This attitude, though not very heroic, plausibly does not amount to objectionable malice or indifference, thus excusing Erdemović from blame[6].

Interpreting Rosen's Argument

One can argue that Rosen need not endorse the Strawsonian generalisation regarding excuses arising from duress if the presence of duress itself determines the validity of an excuse, not the moral agent's quality of will. Consider the two most plausible definitions of duress in the

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[3] Gideon Rosen, 'Culpability and Duress: A Case Study', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume (2014), 88 (1): p. 79-80
[4] Gideon Rosen, 'Culpability and Duress: A Case Study', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume (2014), 88 (1): p. 71-73
[5] Ibid., p. 75-76
[6] Ibid., p. 81-82

context of morality: the first is coercion that limits the moral agent's freedom of choice to the point of leaving no alternative course of action which can be morally demanded, and the second is coercion that forces the moral agent to act in a manner which is both morally wrong and does not correspond to their will. Erdemović's case, even in its modified version, fits both definitions of duress. This is because he is coerced into committing murder, which he would otherwise not commit, and because his only alternative to committing murder is to forfeit his own life, which is a course of action that cannot be morally demanded of Erdemović. Therefore, Rosen's conclusion that Erdemović should be morally excused might be seen as substantiated by duress alone, thus not compelling Rosen to adopt a Strawsonian approach to the matter.

I argue that the mere presence of duress, on both of its plausible definitions, cannot be sufficient to excuse, and that the validity of an excuse in cases where duress is present must still be determined by the moral agent's quality of will. Consider the first of our definitions of duress and suppose that another soldier, Pavlović, who is in the same battalion as Erdemović, is given the same orders and would also be executed if he refused to obey. However, Pavlović is far keener on shooting the captives and does not protest. In this scenario, Pavlović seems obviously blameworthy even though, just like Erdemović, he did not have an alternative course of action which we can morally demand. This demonstrates that, if the first of our definitions of duress is adopted, it is still the quality of will, not merely the presence of duress, that determines the validity of motivational excuses.

However, if the second of our definitions of duress is adopted, then Pavlović's case fails to prove that the quality of will determines the validity of motivational excuses because the action to which Pavlović is coerced does indeed correspond to his own will. To prove that the presence of duress does not in itself provide an excuse under the second definition as well, I will consider another hypothetical scenario. Suppose that Stanković is a particularly barbaric

soldier in Erdemović's battalion, whose intention is to torture the captives instead of executing them. Nonetheless, he is also ordered to execute them and told that if he does not obey, then he himself will also be executed for insubordination. Stanković is forced to commit a wrongdoing, namely murder, and that wrongdoing would not have otherwise been committed by him if he could freely exercise his will, so the case fits the second definition of duress. Nevertheless, Stanković is surely not excused for his actions. This is because, in Stanković's case, the presence of duress simply modified the manner in which his objectionable quality of will was to be displayed. Erdemović's case is different in precisely the way which is relevant for an excuse, which is that his actions are not a display of objectionable quality of will but of the unobjectionable desire for self-preservation. Therefore, for Erdemović, the presence of duress is responsible for the entirety of the wrongdoing rather than merely the manner in which it occurred. This shows that when duress is defined as coercion to wrongdoing that does not correspond to the agent's will, it is still the quality of that agent's will that determines if the presence of duress is sufficient to morally excuse them and not the presence of duress itself.

Cognitive Excuses

Before analysing Rosen's particularly interesting and controversial hypothetical cases of Goldberg and Kleinbart, it is necessary to outline the framework of Rosen's argument regarding cognitive excuses. The core ideas driving that argument are those of negligence and culpability.

Negligence refers to the failure to discharge one's epistemic duties, meaning the failure to take reasonable precautions to obtain the necessary information for moral decision-making[7].

[7] Gideon Rosen, 'Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 105, No 10 (Oct 2008), p. 601

For example, a doctor who fails to check the patient's chart and prescribes penicillin to which the patient is allergic is negligent[8].

Culpability is a term used by Rosen to describe instances in which one's ignorance results from negligence that is not itself excusable. For example, if a doctor fails to perform a newly developed diagnostic test, then they are negligent. However, their culpability for negligence will depend on the circumstances. If they fail to perform the test because they were too lazy to familiarise themselves with the new evidence, then they are culpable for their negligence. If, however, the doctor failed to perform the test because their colleagues, out of their own malicious intent, convinced the doctor that the new test was not worth performing, then the doctor is not culpable for their negligence[9].

We therefore arrive at the discussion of the Goldberg and the Kleinbart cases with the following picture of cognitive excuses. One is excused if their ignorance is not negligent, meaning that they are ignorant despite having discharged all their epistemic duties. One is also excused if they are not culpable for their negligence, meaning that they are ignorant due to negligence that is itself excusable. One is not excused if they are culpable for their ignorance, meaning that their ignorance is the foreseeable upshot of culpable negligence.

Section II: The Goldberg Case, The Kleinbart Case and Objections to Rosen's View

The Goldberg Case

Goldberg is tasked with investigating financial impropriety. He is a diligent detective and conducts his investigation 'by the book'. The evidence he uncovers in the process clearly points to Himmelfarb as the guilty party. Unbeknownst to Goldberg, Himmelfarb is being framed and is not guilty. Before declaring Himmelfarb guilty, Goldberg sees Himmelfarb's

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[8] Ibid., p. 600

[9] Gideon Rosen, 'Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 105, No 10 (Oct 2008), p. 604-605

mother, who is adamant that her son is innocent and pleads with Goldberg to dig deeper than the protocol requires in his investigation. Goldberg promises to do so, but fails to deliver on his promise and falsely accuses Himmelfarb[10].

Intuitively, Goldberg should not be excused (neither for breaking the promise nor for falsely accusing Himmelfarb). It also seems intuitive that, if not for the promise that Goldberg makes and breaks, he would have been excused for falsely blaming Himmelfarb. Rosen shares both intuitions[11]. However, inferring such conclusions from Rosen's framework of cognitive excuses is challenging. Goldberg is undoubtedly ignorant of Himmelfarb's innocence, but is his ignorance the consequence of culpable negligence?

Negligence requires failure to discharge one's epistemic duties, and as Goldberg's case stipulates, he is epistemically diligent in his investigation. For Rosen, Goldberg's blameworthiness, therefore, relies on the promise being an additional epistemic obligation and not merely a moral one (otherwise Goldberg will only be blameworthy for breaking the promise, not for falsely accusing Himmelfarb). This is somewhat difficult to argue, because if we imagine that Goldberg works as part of a team, it is intuitively clear that the other members who made no promise to Himmelfarb's mother are completely epistemically justified in their belief that Himmelfarb is guilty.[12] Rosen's solution is to claim that, despite Goldberg's promise being a moral rather than an epistemic obligation, it is nevertheless similar enough in nature to an epistemic obligation. Specifically, it is grounded in a concern for truth and avoidance of error, making its violation evidence of negligence for which Goldberg is culpable[13].

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[10] Ibid., p. 601
[11] Gideon Rosen, 'Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 105, No 10 (Oct 2008), p. 602
[12] Ibid., p. 602-603
[13] Ibid., p. 601-603

The Kleinbart Case

For the sake of completing Rosen's framework of cognitive excuses, let us temporarily accept his solution to the Goldberg case and approach the most complicated of the hypothetical scenarios — the Kleinbart case.

Kleinbart and his wife are having dinner with some friends when Kleinbart decides to tell a story about his domestic life. The story becomes increasingly personal, making his wife increasingly uncomfortable[14]. Despite her distress being both warranted and noticeable to others at the table, Kleinbart fails to notice it and continues the storytelling. We know that at some point during their marriage, Kleinbart fell out of love with his wife, so he fails to notice her distress simply because he does not care much about her. However, Kleinbart is very aware of his natural lack of empathy towards his wife and does everything he can to compensate for it. Rosen stipulates that Kleinbart is not reckless or negligent in launching into the story and that he fulfils all the reasonable duties required to ensure he is not overstepping the line. Rosen also stipulates that Kleinbart's indifference towards his wife is a product of a gradual decline in serotonin levels over many years, which he had no control over and which, upon acknowledging, he always tried to compensate for[15].

Rosen believes that in this scenario Kleinbart is not negligent and hence should be excused. This is because we have stipulated that he was not negligent or reckless in launching into the story (he had not previously told this story or know that his wife found it offensive, and had not had other evidence available to indicate that)[16], nor was his ignorance traceable to any past incidents of negligence. Thus, unlike Goldberg, Kleinbart at no point failed to discharge

[14] Gideon Rosen, 'Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 105, No 10 (Oct 2008), p. 605-606
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., p. 607

any of his epistemic duties or any other duties that are epistemic-like in their truth-oriented nature[17].

Rosen's conclusion that Kleinbart should be excused for his storytelling seems to demonstrate that the Strawsonian account fails with respect to cognitive excuses[18]. The Strawsonian approach suggests that if a wrong action is taken with objectionable quality of will, then it is not excused[19]. Kleinbart is markedly indifferent towards his wife, which is clear evidence of an objectionable quality of will. Kleinbart's wrongdoing is likewise apparent, as even the friends at the dinner table found the storytelling appallingly inconsiderate. Thus, it seems that a comprehensive theory of excuses must have separate accounts for motivational and cognitive excuses, one relying on the quality of will and the other on negligence and culpability[20].

The Inconsistency Objection

I argue that attributing moral significance to quality of will in the assessment of motivational excuses and not in the assessment of cognitive excuses constitutes a kind of inconsistency that is difficult to justify. The Erdemović and the Pavlović cases demonstrate the moral value of the quality of will regarding excuses. It is precisely because Erdemović displayed sufficient concern for the victims in the circumstances he was in, and precisely because Pavlović lacked that concern in those exact circumstances, that Erdemović should plausibly be excused and Pavlović should most certainly be held blameworthy. Therefore, the claim that moral significance shifts from a framework grounded in the quality of will regarding motivational excuses to an entirely different framework of negligence and culpability

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[17] Ibid., p. 607-608
[18] Ibid., p. 607-608
[19] P. F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment', Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 48 (1962), p. 193
[20] Gideon Rosen, 'Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 105, No 10 (Oct 2008), p. 606-609

regarding cognitive excuses requires making a fundamental distinction between the two types of excuses. Such a distinction is difficult to justify because the role of the quality of will appears to be unchanged between cases for cognitive and motivational excuses. Cognitive excuses, as Rosen's own scenarios demonstrate, do not exclude the quality of will as a key and identifiable factor. Whether in the case of Goldberg, Kleinbart or the various others that Rosen considers, the quality of will is always present and relevant to the assessment of the actions of the moral agents. The only principled difference between the two types of excuses is in the forces which caused the action to be dissociated from the underlying quality of will, namely duress and ignorance. Therefore, since the agent's quality of will affects both ignorance and duress cases, and is morally significant, it should plausibly be morally significant for both kinds of excuses.

The Misinterpretation Objection

Rosen justifies the necessity of having a distinctive approach to cognitive and motivational excuses through a counterexample in the form of the Kleinbart case, in the interpretation of which I argue Rosen makes a mistake. In Kleinbart's case, Rosen rightly concludes that Kleinbart deserves to be excused, but falsely believes this conclusion to be incompatible with the Strawsonian account of cognitive excuses[21]. This is because Rosen misidentifies the objectionable quality of will in the Kleinbart case, confusing wider relationship dynamics with case-specific attitudes. When passing moral judgement, what matters is not the presence of an objectionable quality of will, but its display[22]. One cannot be held responsible for their animosity or indifference towards another, even if such attitudes are unwarranted, if their actions are entirely appropriate and do not in any way express an objectionable quality of

[21] Gideon Rosen, 'Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 105, No 10 (Oct 2008), p. 607
[22] P. F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment', Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 48 (1962), p. 195

will. Kleinbart is indeed indifferent to his wife on the whole, and that indifference can certainly constitute an objectionable quality of will. However, indifference describes Kleinbart's relationship with his wife, not the attitude he displays when telling the story at the dinner table. The very fact that Kleinbart is epistemically diligent, taking all the reasonable precautions to not be insensitive towards his wife, is evidence that he is neither indifferent nor malicious in the specific action that is under moral scrutiny. An action taken with indifference cannot be taken with precaution, for precaution by definition suggests an attempt to avoid a certain outcome, thus making one not indifferent to that outcome. Rosen's stipulation that all reasonable precautions have been taken by Kleinbart demonstrates both his intention to avoid upsetting his wife and that this intention has been expressed. Kleinbart's general attitude towards his wife is therefore irrelevant, as it would be subject to a separate moral assessment, one that assesses his quality as a husband and not his blameworthiness on the storytelling occasion.

A response in defence of Rosen's view can be made by claiming that Kleinbart's precautions against upsetting his wife are sufficient in the procedural sense, meaning that no more can be reasonably demanded of him, but are insufficient in the attitudinal sense, meaning that his obliviousness is still an expression of his lack of care for his wife. Sufficiency of the taken precautions, as Rosen himself states, ensures that Kleinbart is not negligent in launching into the story, and therefore is not judged for doing so. However, that is not enough to excuse his failure to notice his wife's distress and continue with the story, which is a result of deficient concern and therefore of objectionable quality of will. This response therefore relies on Kleinbart's obliviousness being in itself an expression of his attitude towards his wife, not just the precautions he takes to keep this attitude in check.

I argue that Kleinbart's obliviousness cannot itself be viewed as an expression of an objectionable quality of will towards his wife because it is not a product of any choice or

action that Kleinbart takes. To demonstrate this argument, I will first consider an alternative hypothetical scenario, one where Kleinbart's failure is not of a moral nature but is brought about in the same manner as his failure to notice his wife's distress. Suppose that before going out for dinner, Kleinbart's wife lost an earring and asked Kleinbart to help her search for it. Partly because of his lack of affection towards his wife, Kleinbart finds this request an annoying inconvenience. However, he is conscious of his initial internal reaction, and in spite of it, he chooses to help search for the missing earring. He is diligent in his search, looking in all the places where he can be reasonably expected to look. However, despite the earring being in his sight multiple times, he is not attentive enough and fails to notice it.

Note that the argument does not rely on Kleinbart's failures (to find the earring and notice his wife's distress) being of similar moral nature, as it is enough to merely demonstrate that neither scenario involves a display of objectionable indifference. In the missing earring case, Kleinbart's actions do not display a lack of care for his wife because every choice he makes, given what he perceives, is exactly the choice that a loving husband (who would not display objectionable quality of will) would have made. Kleinbart never chooses to miss the earring, much like he does not choose to fail to notice his wife's distress. Rather, he chooses to act appropriately but fails to achieve a satisfactory outcome due to the nature of his character, which is beyond his control. The fact that Kleinbart does not have control over his diminished care is not a point of contention, as Rosen stipulates that it is a product of a gradual decline in serotonin levels. Kleinbart's failures are therefore not a product of any choice or action that he can control, and it is those actions and choices which are under moral scrutiny in the specific case of storytelling, not his general character[23].

[23] A related distinction, between responsibility as attributability and as accountability, is drawn by Gary Watson, 'Two Faces of Responsibility', Philosophical Topics, Vol. 24, No 2 (Fall 1996), p. 229-235; the argument of this essay does not depend on it.

The distinction between having an objectionable quality of will and displaying it, in Kleinbart's case, is particularly evident due to our intuition that he is not a very good husband, even if he can be excused on the storytelling occasion. It is precisely because Kleinbart does not display objectionable quality of will in the storytelling case, but does display it across his relationship with his wife generally (for example by choosing not to be honest about his feelings), that we judge him as a husband and yet do not blame him for the act of telling the story.

The Strawsonian Generalisation and The Framework of Negligence and Culpability

One may still be unconvinced that Rosen's scenarios are compatible with the Strawsonian generalisation, as the appeal to the quality of will alone might not allow for an intuitive way of reaching acceptable conclusions in other contentious cases, such as that of Goldberg. Rosen's framework of negligence and culpability allowed for intuitive conclusions to be reached in that scenario. Can the same be done by appealing to the quality of will? I argue that it can, and having established that Rosen's framework of cognitive excuses is not at odds with the Strawsonian approach after all, I further argue that recognising the moral value of the quality of will within Rosen's framework allows for reaching more intuitive conclusions than the framework otherwise allows.

Typically, the quality of will of a moral agent is assessed through the sufficiency or insufficiency of goodwill that they display towards agents affected by their actions[24]. However, the quality of will that can be morally demanded from a detective like Goldberg is difficult to determine, as displaying goodwill towards the suspect is hardly necessary and possibly unprofessional. Nevertheless, an undeniably necessary aspect of the unobjectionable quality of the will of a detective is a genuine desire to uncover the truth. As Rosen himself

[24] P. F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment', Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 48 (1962), p. 192

argues, Goldberg imposes on himself a truth-oriented duty by making the promise, meaning that fulfilling that duty will impact his investigation directly and thus further his efforts in uncovering the truth. Therefore, by breaking the promise to Himmelfarb's mother, Goldberg arguably displays a lack of concern for uncovering the truth, thus making his quality of will questionable and his claim for an excuse shaky.

So far, the claim that breaking the promise demonstrates Goldberg's display of an objectionable quality of will might not be very convincing, especially considering that the terms of Goldberg's promise go beyond what is typically required of him. However, I argue that this is a feature rather than a bug, as it allows for flexibility in determining whether Goldberg has a valid excuse depending on the reasons that he has for breaking the promise, something that Rosen's account otherwise lacks. Consider a modified version of the Goldberg case. Imagine that Goldberg broke the promise because, just as he was about to question more secondary witnesses, a case file landed on his desk marked 'URGENT'. Knowing that there was insufficient time to both adequately investigate the new case and fulfil his promise, Goldberg prioritised new work due to a significantly greater likelihood of his efforts proving fruitful if he chose to investigate the new case. Intuitively, Goldberg now has a much better claim to be excused. This intuition follows the Strawsonian approach exactly, as further context changes how we view the fact that Goldberg broke his promise, with that no longer serving as evidence of his lack of concern for uncovering the truth and therefore voiding any legitimate objections to the quality of will he displays in this matter.

Note that Rosen's approach in isolation does not satisfy our intuition in the modified Goldberg case. Rosen's framework excuses Goldberg's ignorance only if he is either not negligent or not culpable for that negligence. Goldberg is clearly ignorant of Himmelfarb's innocence, and he is negligent because, by breaking the promise, he fails to discharge an epistemic-like duty. Therefore, Rosen can only conclude that Goldberg is excused in the

modified case if he is not culpable for his negligence. However, for that to be the case, either the reason for breaking the promise must be outside of Goldberg's control or his ignorance must not be a foreseeable upshot of failing to discharge an epistemic-like duty, much like in the example of the doctor who was tricked by his colleagues into falsely believing that a useful diagnostic test was futile. Neither is the case here, as Goldberg knew that fulfilling his promise would directly affect his investigation, and his decision to break the promise was entirely voluntary. Therefore, despite the strong intuition that a 'good' reason for Goldberg's ignorance should provide him with an excuse, a standalone Rosenian framework does not excuse Goldberg in the modified version of his case because his ignorance is a foreseeable upshot of culpable negligence.

In Rosen's defence, an argument can be made to suggest that his framework allows for Goldberg to be excused, even in the modified case, by appealing to the definition of negligence. Negligence requires failure to take reasonable precautions to obtain the necessary information for moral decision-making. If fulfilling the promise to Himmelfarb's mother does not constitute a reasonable epistemic precaution, then failing to do so does not amount to negligence and therefore makes Goldberg eligible for a cognitive excuse. The circumstances, specifically the urgent case awaiting Goldberg's attention, plausibly render any further digging into Himmelfarb's case unreasonable. Therefore, Goldberg is not negligent in breaking the promise and is excused for doing so.

However, this response itself demonstrates how the Rosenian framework of cognitive excuses relies on quality of will, specifically by adopting it as the metric by which reasonableness of an epistemic precaution is judged. Without appealing to quality of will, Rosen's framework does not hold the conceptual power to claim that fulfilling the promise is an unreasonable demand. This is because, as Rosen himself argues, the promise constitutes a truth-oriented duty, and avoiding negligence requires such duties to be discharged. Goldberg's choice to

break the promise and focus on the new case is only seen as not unreasonable because it expresses sufficient concern for the truth, which is a fact about his quality of will. If such facts are irrelevant to cognitive excuses, then there is no good reason to claim that fulfilling the promise is unreasonable and therefore no good reason to claim that Rosen's framework alone allows Goldberg to be excused in the modified version of his case. Therefore, Rosen's framework only achieves the intuitive conclusion when it quietly relies on quality of will and not by disregarding its moral significance.

Conclusion

Rosen argues, primarily through the Erdemović and the Kleinbart cases, that the Strawsonian approach of appealing to the quality of will to determine the validity of moral excuses is only adequately applicable to motivational excuses. Cognitive excuses instead require a different framework of negligence and culpability. I argued that the similar role of the quality of will in both motivational and cognitive excuses highlights an inconsistency in the Rosenian approach of accepting its moral significance to one type of excuse and not to the other. I then argued that Rosen's approach to cognitive excuses need not be at odds with the Strawsonian one, as the Kleinbart case used to demonstrate the conflict between the two is misinterpreted by Rosen, who confuses Kleinbart having and displaying objectionable quality of will, with only the latter being significant for the specific moral assessment at hand. Furthermore, I argued that appealing to the quality of will allows one to reach intuitive conclusions in the Kleinbart and the Goldberg cases, and that recognising the moral value of the quality of will within Rosen's wider framework of negligence and culpability also allows one to reach intuitive conclusions in other cases, such as the modified Goldberg case, where using the framework alone fails to do so. Thus, I conclude that determining whether one should be excused for their wrongdoing requires considering the quality of will displayed by the agent

towards the affected parties, and that such consideration is not inherently at odds with the Rosenian framework of negligence and culpability.

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